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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
this reasoning is especially true where it is admitted that no liability
exists in the absence of such protection, but, as the Kojis case demon-
strates, logical objections impose no barrier to the Wisconsin court if
insurance is involved. Although Missouri seems to be the only juris-
diction which has completely abolished the parent's immunity, at least
seventeen other jurisdictions hold the parent liable for willful or wanton
negligence. 43 The Wisconsin court is now demonstrating an ability to
resolve questions based upon public policy. Since the availability of in-
surance would protect the family coffers, and since the wife is per-
mitted to sue the husband, it is not a remote possibility that an un-
emancipated minor will be allowed to recover from his parent in negli-
gence cases.
In conclusion, the Kojis case not only destroys charitable immuni-
ties," but, also, it casts grave doubts as to the future longevity of de-
fenses such as governmental immunity and parental immunity in Wis-
consin.
DONALD F. FITZGERALD
Respondeat Superior, Basic Test for Application of Doctrine-
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which she was a pas-
senger was struck by another auto driven by an employee of co-
defendants. Flodeen, the employee, was a day laborer of Tracy and
Son Farms, a co-partnership engaged in general farming.
In the normal routine of employment, laborers reported to the
home farm of Tracy and Son, where they received assignments to
work in designated fields. Transportation was customarily furnished
by the employer to carry the workers to the particular fields to
which they had been assigned.
On the day of the accident, Flodeen drove his car to the home
farm where he received his assignment to drive a tractor in a desig-
nated field. A truck, with driver, was on hand to take him and the
other workers to the fields. The weather threatened rain, and Flo-
deen told the foreman that he would drive his own car to the field,
so that if rain began and field work was discontinued he would not
48 Supra note 34.
4Judicial decisions abolishing the immunity have been reversed by statute in
three states. (1) Rhode Island: Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411(1879); changed by sec. 38, ch. 177, R.I. Gen. Laws (1896); R.I. Gen. Laws
§7-1-22 (1956) ; cf. 44 MARQ. L. Ray. 153 at 159-160; see Morrison v. Henke,
165 Wis. 166, 169, 160 N.W. 173 (1917). (2) Kansas, Noel v. Menninger Foun-
dation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954) overruled by statute, Laws of Kan-
sas (1959) Chapter 127. (3) New Jersey has many cases denying immunity but
a statute was recently passed, though held not retroactive, granting immunity
to charitable associations from liability to any persons who suffer damages from
the negligence of any agents or servants of the charitable associations. L.
1959, c. 90, on June 11, 1959, N.J.S.A. 2A: 53 A-7 et seq. See 25 A.L.R. 2d 29-
200 in the 1960 and 1961 supplements.
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have to wait for the truck to come for him, but could start back to
Janesville without delay. He had an afternoon job in Janesville for
another employer. It was not unusual for employees to use their
own cars in this way, and the foreman made no objection to Flo-
deen's proposal. Soon after the truck left, Flodeen started for the
fields. On the way, his auto collided with the car in which the plain-
tiff was a passenger.
In the Circuit Court the defendant employer moved for summary
judgment dismissing the action as to itself. The court denied the
motion, stating in its opinion:
A jury issue exists as to whether the employee, Flodeen,
had stepped aside the business of his principal to accomplish
an independent purpose of his own, or whether he was actuated
by an intent to carry out his employment and to serve his
master.
Held Order reversed: cause remanded with instructions to order
summary judgment in accordance with appellant's motion.,
The issue presented by the facts was whether or not Flodeen
was acting within the scope of his employment so as to render his
master vicariously liable. The court determined the controlling
principle to be that stated in 1 Restatement, Agency, Second §228(2):
Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employ-
ment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond
the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by
a purpose to serve the master. [Emphasis by the court.]
The doctrine of respondeat superior, despite its firm entrench-
ment in our jurisprudence, is a doctrine of ambiguous origin.2 In
considerable degree, its militates against a fundamental notion of
Anglo-American law that personal liability should be posited on
personal fault 3 a notion which schools of sociological jurisprudence
have recently challenged.4 Regardless of the jurisprudential school
to which one belongs, however, there is inherent in the principle of
imputed liability the vexing problem of how to limit the principle:
the problem of determining precisely where to stop the imputation
process. The nominal limitation universally accepted is that sug-
gested by the "scope of employment." 5
I Strack v. Strack, 12 Wis. 2d 537, 107 N.W. 2d 632 (1961).
2 35 Amf. JUR. Master and Servant §543 (1941).
3 "I assume that common-sense is opposed to making one man pay for another
man's wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass according to
the ordinary canons of legal responsibility, -unless, that is to say, he has
induced the immediate wrong-doer to do acts of which the wrong, or, at least
wrong, was the natural consequence under the circumstances known to the
defendant." Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1891).
4 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS §26.5 (1956).
5 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §181 (1948).
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The application of this somewhat amorphous concept to precise
circumstances ordinarily proves to be a process of extreme diffi-
culty.6 The plain fact is that an employed person does not cease to
be a person; he does not cease to eat, sleep, and generally to live
as a person, nor to be motivated by the same personal considerations
which influence his behavior, irrespective of employment. The em-
ployment simply superimposes new, separate and sometimes dif-
ferent influences on the motivations of the employed person. This
process of admixture is not resultant in an act motivated purely by
the employment, nor in one motivated by personal considerations
alone. It is inextricably the product of the two combined.
To a considerable extent, the imputation of liability will be gov-
erned by considerations of underlying public policy.7 This fact can
no more aptly be illustrated than by the history of the term "scope
of employment" as used in Workmen's Compensation cases. De-
spite the fact that compensation statutes most commonly employ
the term "arising out of and in the course of employment"8 many
courts fell into the unfortunate practice of equating that phrase to
"scope of employment." The two were regarded as being at least
broadly analogous; in fact they are still so regarded by a number
of courtsP The analogy between the two areas of law seems to have
reached its apex in the case of Kohlian v. Hyland,10 when the North
Dakota Court stated:
We have heretofore said that the underlying philosophy
of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that industry, not
the individual, shall bear the risk of injury to the laborers
engaged therein .... There is always present the possibility
of injury to employees, notwithstanding every conceivable
precaution may be taken to guard against it. So it is when
we look at the situation from the viewpoint of the public.
There is an ever-present probability that third persons will
suffer injury because somebody's servant is careless, disobedi-
ent, or unfaithful to his matser. This is a real, not an imag-
inary risk, to which bear abundant witness the development
of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the myriad cases
where courts have been lost in the maze of metaphysical re-
finement in definition between frolic and detour. This latter
risk to the public is clearly one which industry, (on) the
analogy of the Compensation Act, may well be required to
carry, within reasonable bounds.11
The point of particular interest here, however, is that the force
6 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 Atl. 434
(1937).
7 PROSSER, TORTS 350 (2d, ed. 1955).
8 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW §6.10 (1952).
9 Porter v. South Penn. Oil Co., 125 W.Va. 361, 24 S.E. 2d 330 (1943).1054 N.D. 215, 210 N.W. 643 (1926).
11 Id. at 645.
[Vol. 45
RECENT DECISIONS
of the analogy was ultimately rejected in certain jurisdictions, prin-
cipally because of the determination that the policy-bases of the two
were different.12 "Scope of employment" implied a degree of con-
servatism of extension which was deemed inconsistent with the lib-
eral philosophy of Workmen's Compensation.
A signal feature of the principal case is its failure to advert to
the much cited "Cardozo Test," which has dominated a substantial
percentage of respondeat superior cases involving traveling em-
ployees for thirty years. The test was suggested in Marks Depend-
ents v. Gray,"3 and was formally introduced into Wisconsin juris-
prudence in 1931.14 The test squarely faced the problem of an em-
ployee undertaking a journey under mixed motivation, partly busi-
ness and partly personal. It suggested a local device for determining
whether the trip should be regarded as primarily business and in-
cidentally personal, or vice versa; a simple "but for" concept. On
the face of the matter, the test appeared to be complete. The flaw,
however, lay in the assumption that it was "the trip," rather than
an aspect or circumstance of "the trip," upon which the concept
should be applied.
In the instant case, for example, the Cardozo test could be ap-
plied to produce contradictory results. On the one hand, the only
circumstances prompting the employee to travel from the home
farm to the assigned work field, regarding the simple termini of his
"trip," was the requirement of the employment. Hence, had the em-
ployment been discontinued, "the trip" would not have been made;
and by the logic of the test, it should be deemed business travel. On
the other hand, under the circumstances here present, no trip by
the employee's personal automobile was in any sense required by the
exigencies of the business. In this aspect, under the test, the move-
ment of the employee's car was the primary purpose of "the trip"
and it was, therefore, personal.
Because of these two facets of the test, dependence upon it may
prove impossible. In the case of Erickson v. Great Northern Rail-
way,'5 which the court cites as strongly parallel in its facts to the
instant case, the Cardozo test was urged upon the court by the
plaintiff in support of his contention, but turned back upon him in
the opinion:
If the facts shown in the record justify the premise upon
which the test assumed is founded, it may be conceded that
plaintiff's position is tenable. But as we have seen the trouble
with plaintiff is that the premise does not exist. That Johnson
'12Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275 (1919).
13 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929).
14 Barragar v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 205 Wis. 550, 238 N.W. 368
(1931).
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was the servant of the railway company and that he was
being paid wages at the time the trip was made are conceded
facts. But in making this trip he was not on an errand of his
employer, but made the same for his own purpose and con-
venience only. It is also true that he had no personal reason
for getting to the coach yards except that of getting his car to
that particular point to suit and serve his own personal con-
venience. And applying plaintiff's own test, it conclusively
appears that Johnson was not in any sense in the furtherance
of his employer's business.16
The Wisconsin Court, aware of the fact that uniform results have
not been obtained in the decisions of cases of this nature, states:
It must be admitted that the reported decisions in substan-
stially similar circumstances are not unanimous in determin-
ing that the employee has or has not gone outside the scope
of his employment when driving his own automobile. The
present parties find citations in good measure to support their
respective contentions. Many of such contrary results cannot
be reconciled with each other."
Perhaps a more familiar background tending to demonstrate the
deficiency of the Cardozo test is that provided by the detour cases.
Again, viewed simply as involving a single "trip," most of the cases
would tend to answer themselves, because it is generally conceded
that the "main" travel is performed in the business of the employer.
The problem is in separating off the particular segment or aspect
of the travel which is alleged to constitute the non-business detour,
and which casts the particular activity in a totally different context.
Radical divergencies of judicial viewpoint have developed over this
question, both on the issue of what personal detours take the em-
ployee outside the scope of his employment, and on the companion
issue of precisely when he is deemed to have returned within the
scope."
It is doubtful that the effort of the Restatement of Agency to
meet the basic problem suggests any new or improved test or stand-
ard. That portion of the Restatement of Agency, Second §228(2)
taking conduct out of the scope of employment which is ". . . too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master," shifts upon the court
the burden of interpretation of a standard, the controlling factors of
which may radically diverge from case to case. Again the litigants and
the courts are faced with considerations of time, space, pay status, and
the multitude of other factors which may in a given situation be con-
sidered controlling.' 9
15 191 Minn. 285, 253 N.W. 770 (1934).16 Id. at 772.
1"Strack v. Strack, supra note 1 at 542.18 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS §26.8 (1956).
'9 38 WORDS AND PHRASES, Scope of Employment 347-362.
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The question is whether subjective motivation ought to be re-
garded as having controlling significance. Considerable stress was
placed, both in the principal case and in the Erickson case, upon the
sworn declarations of the employee that he was, in fact, motivated
entirely by personal considerations, even to the point of convincing
the court that: "Not only is there 'little' actuation by a purpose to
serve the master-there is no such purpose at all. ' 20 This would
seem incautious and unrealistic. if grounded, as it appears to have
been, upon the employee's declarations after the event, then it would
seem to rest the entire issue upon the credibility of the employee in
making the declaration.
In last analysis, we must probably return to our original sup-
position: that motivation, especially as a subjective thing, is an un-
reliable gauge at best by which to test the propriety of imputing
fault to the employer. Indeed section 228(1) of the Restatement
tends in some measure to contradict the above cited provision of
§228(2), in requiring only that conduct of the servant must be actuated
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. [Emphasis supplied.]
Motivation will usually be found, realistically, to be mixed.
Little assistance is provided by regarding the question as one of
employer consent. The reason is that such alleged "consent" may,
equivocally, amount either to an "authorization" or "direction" to
do the employer's work by the particular instrumentality, means,
or method suggested by the employee; or it may amount to a mere
acquiescence in the employee's temporary departure from his em-
ployment to accomplish a purpose of his own.21 By much the same
token, the "right of control" factor suggested in Restatement of Agency,
Second, §239, and also relied upon in support of the principal decision,
tends to beg the ultimate question.
Perhaps a more objective and surer test would lie in an ex-
amination of the sources of the particular risks which produce the
injury complained of. In the principal case, it is inescapable that the
transportation of employees to their respective fields was solely the
concern and business of the employer. The risks inherent in that
process were, broadly and generally, risks created by him. At the
same time, however, the employer had acted to limit such risks to
those incident to a given method of accomplishing his purpose: a
single truck trip to the respective fields. Had business necessity
prompted the substitution of the employee's private automobile for
this method, a logical connection would have existed between the
business and the particular risk which occasioned the injury. But it
is substantially uncontradicted that, regardless of the obvious busi-
20 Strack v. Strack, supra note 1 at 541. .
21.52 A.L.R. 2d 287-396 (1954).
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ness connection of the journey itself, the risk incident to performing
it by private car was undertaken solely for the employee's personal
convenience. In this aspect of the case, no mixed motivation objec-
tively existed. Much the same sort of reasoning appears to underlie
the frolic and detour cases. 2 To escape imputed responsibility for
the conduct of an employee who is substantially within the author-
ized time and space limits of his employment, the employer should
be, and ordinarily is, required to demonstrate that the particular act
in which the employee was engaged was undertaken entirely for his
own purposes, and involved a risk of harm, separate and distinct
from that involved in the general course of the employment.3 This
appears to be the underlying principle of the Restatement of Agency
§239, and the Erickson case.
It must be appreciated that the problems of definition above sug-
gested are ultimately problems of policy. Each attempt to deter-
mine a close case will ultimately founder upon shoals of indefinite-
ness and uncertainty, until at least a single universal policy is deter-
mined to constitute the governing principle of imputability.
DANIEL RIORDAN
22 HAIRER AND JAMES, supra note 18.
23 Ibid.
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